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“There is nothing more practical than a good theory”
(Lewin, 1951)
In this issue of Developmental cognitive neuroscience Shulman
nd colleagues (n.d.) and Nelson and colleagues (n.d.) present
wo heuristic models of cognitive development. Shulman and col-
eagues review the current evidence in favor of dual systems (DS)
odels, which suggests that enhanced risk taking in adolescents
s the consequence of an imbalance between an early maturing
otivational system involved in reward processing and a later
aturing cognitive control system. They conclude with the view-
oint that the current literature seems to reafﬁrm the usefulness
f these models. In a similar fashion, Nelson and colleagues (n.d.)
resented an updated version of the social information processing
odel (SIP), a heuristic framework which links facets of social
evelopment (ranging form infant caregiver interactions to inti-
ate relationships during adolescence) with functional changes in
he developing brain.
Models are one of the central instruments of modern science
e.g. the double helix model of DNA, the billiard ball model of a
as, or the mind as a computer). However, not all models are alike
nd different types of models serve different functions in the pro-
ess of scientiﬁc discovery (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006). The current
odels of adolescent brain development, including the ones pre-
ented in this issue, are often labeled as heuristic models (Casey,
014; Crone and Dahl, 2012; Nelson et al., n.d.; Richards et al., 2013;
hulman et al., n.d.). However, it is not always clear what heuristic
odels are and what role they have. It is currently unclear if, and
ow, different heuristic models can be meaningfully compared, or
o what extend they aid the formulation of testable hypotheses.
oreover, although there are many results that can be interpreted
s being consistent with heuristic models, we will argue that such
omparisons have only limited value and may  even hamper further
nvestigation of the underlying developmental mechanisms.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: vandenbos@mpib-berlin.mpg.de (W.  van den Bos).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2015.12.011
878-9293/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uIn this comment we provide a critical review of heuristic mod-
els, making speciﬁc references to the DS and SIP models, focusing
on their ability to move the ﬁeld of developmental cognitive neu-
roscience forward toward a mechanistic understanding of neural
development. We aim to make a contribution to the debate around
models by (1) providing further conceptual clariﬁcation and a
framework to evaluate different types of models, and (2) by high-
lighting the beneﬁts of a stronger commitment to cognitive models
in order to generate testable hypotheses and integrate different
levels of analyses (including neuroscience). First, we discuss the
role of heuristic models in science as frameworks for inspiration and
research agenda setting. Although heuristic models are by nature
simplistic, we  will suggest several principles that can be used to
evaluate them. Next we discuss one direction that could be taken to
foster the transition from heuristic models to cognitive neuroscience
models, from agenda setting to hypothesis testing.
1.1. Heuristics and the context of discovery
The classic distinction between “context of discovery” and “con-
text of justiﬁcation” (Popper, 1959; Reichenbach, 1938) provides
a good starting point in organizing the debate on the different
models of adolescent brain development. That is the distinction
between the context in which new ideas or hypotheses are gen-
erated, and the context in which those are defended. For instance,
reading a novel (e.g. Romeo and Juliet) can lead to the generation
of numerous different models of the adolescent mind. Whether
the novel itself (context of discovery) may  be overly simplis-
tic or wrong is irrelevant for scientiﬁc progress, as long as the
ideas from the novel are translated into testable theories (con-
text of justiﬁcation), living up to the stricter principles of science
(e.g. falsiﬁability).
The term heuristic is of Greek origin meaning “serving to ﬁnd out
or discover.” Traditionally heuristics are considered to be part of
the context of discovery (Polya, 1957). Indeed, on several occasions
Albert Einstein used falsiﬁed theorems as heuristics to generate a
novel hypothesis (e.g. Einstein, 1905). However, it has been rec-
ognized that within the social sciences heuristic models provide
a ‘context of discovery’ that is less trivial. That is because these
heuristic models in social science, such as the dual-systems (Casey,
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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014; Luna et al., 2013; Shulman et al., n.d.) and social informa-
ion processing (Nelson et al., n.d.) models, have signiﬁcant impact
n budget streams and what type of research is performed and
ublished. Therefore, heuristic models stand with one foot in the
context of justiﬁcation’ (Nickles, 2006) and do require sufﬁcient
otivation and argumentation. This becomes even more impor-
ant if these models are used to communicate the state of science
o people outside the ﬁeld of inquiry (e.g. policy and law-makers).
ere, we suggest two criteria that can be used to evaluate the use-
ulness of heuristic models: simplicity and speciﬁcity. In the next
ection we will brieﬂy address these criteria and apply them to the
odels presented in this volume.
“All models are wrong but some are useful”
(Box, 1976)
.2. Simplicity
A heuristic model is by deﬁnition reductionistic, balancing sim-
licity and speciﬁcity against usefulness. Where simplicity refers
o the number of elements or constructs that make up a model,
peciﬁcity concerns the deﬁnition of these constructs. A model that
s too complex or too unspeciﬁc would not be useful because it
oes not help constrain the hypothesis space, and does not provide
lear starting points for research. However, a model that is too
imple runs into the danger of being too restrictive in its agenda
etting; not leaving enough room for plausible alternative expla-
ations. Finally, a heuristic model that is too speciﬁc turns into the
ypothesis it was supposed to inspire.
First, lets consider simplicity. In this context Shulman et al. (n.d.)
iscuss the triadic model proposed by Ernst et al., 2006. This model
uggests that besides reward seeking and cognitive control, devel-
pmental changes in avoidance behavior, and corresponding neural
ystems (e.g. amygdala and insula), are necessary to explain ado-
escent risky decision-making in its complexity. However, Shulman
t al. (n.d.) state that there is “not much evidence to date indicating
hat the emotion/avoidance system and its developmental trajectory
elp to explain heightened levels of risk taking in adolescence”. Thus,
ccording to Shulman et al. it therefore does not warrant further
eview, nor is it considered a relevant extension of the DS model.
n other words they prefer a simpler 2 systems model to a more
omplex 3 systems model.
There is reason to believe that in this case absence of evidence
ay be taken for evidence of absence. First, for most canoni-
al behavioral tasks it is difﬁcult to distinguish the contribution
f increased approach from that of reduced avoidance on choice
ehavior (Luciana and Segalowitz, 2014). Second, considering the
evelopment of risk preferences we see that adolescents are con-
istently risk-averse, not risk-seeking, just less so than adults (for
eview see Defoe et al., 2015). Fourth, when we turn to the adult
euroscience literature there is ample evidence for involvement
f the proposed avoidance network in risky decision-making (e.g.
ossaerts, 2010; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010). In sum,
e consider a role for avoidance-related processes in risk taking
ery plausible. For these reasons such a system should not be easily
ismissed, but considered a valuable part of a heuristic model.
If we turn to the SIP model we can see that this has so
any moving parts (and their connections) that, even though they
re organized in three nodes, it is challenging to derive speciﬁc
ypotheses about neural mechanisms underlying social behav-
or. Still, there is some value in embracing this complexity and
dmitting to our lack of knowledge about which of the many
omponent processes is most relevant for understanding develop-
ental changes. In contrast to this view, the more restricted DS
odel may  interpret changes in behavior related to social context
irectly in terms of changes in reward related striatal activity (e.g.gnitive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 138–144 139
Chein et al., 2011). However, such a strategy may lead to overlook-
ing that the changes in striatal activity are not due to changes in
modulations of the striatum by regions involved in social cognition.
For example, functional connectivity analyses have shown that the
temporal parietal junction (TPJ) may  modulate value computation
in the striatum (Carter et al., 2012; Hare et al., 2010; van den Bos
et al., 2013), and this social brain region is also known to show
signiﬁcant development across adolescence (Burnett et al., 2011;
Gürog˘lu et al., 2011).
These examples illustrate that one should be aware of being too
simplistic given its negative consequences for knowledge produc-
tion (for similar arguments see Greenwald et al., 1986; Greenwald,
2012). This is particularly dangerous in context of neuroimaging
studies when one may  decide to focus at only a handful highly
selected ROIs, justiﬁed in part by referring to a heuristic model.
As a result, research is actively ignoring parts of the data that are
collected, which will not even allow for serendipitous ﬁndings. For
instance, based on the DS model this may  lead to underreporting
on the roles of the insula or TPJ in adolescent risk-taking. On the
other hand, pursuing a heuristic that is based on only very little
evidence will in the worst-case lead to several non-conﬁrmatory
studies. Thus, we  would argue that in most occasions it is proba-
bly better to err on the side of openness, particularly when there
are alternative hypotheses that are plausible and relatively well
deﬁned.
1.3. Speciﬁcity
Too little speciﬁcity diminishes the usefulness of a heuristic
model, simply because it allows for a potentially unlimited num-
ber of hypotheses that are consistent with it. Additionally, when
moving to the domain of hypothesis testing conceptual speciﬁcity
is strongly related to classic issues of validity (construct, internal,
external; MacKenzie, 2003), which requires both clarity of concepts
and clear description of the relationship between the concepts.
Here we will argue that for both heuristic models (DS and SIP)
there is still room, and need, for further speciﬁcation of the con-
cepts. Given that the DS model is more speciﬁc in its descriptions
compared to the SIP model we will use it as an example but most of
the following general points also apply to the SIP and other heuristic
models. Consider the following statement;
“Speciﬁcally, it proposes that risk-taking behaviors peak during
adolescence because activation of an early-maturing incentive-
processing system (the “socioemotional system”) ampliﬁes
adolescents’ afﬁnity for exciting, novel, and risky activities,
while a countervailing, but slower to mature, “cognitive con-
trol” system is not yet far enough along in its development to
consistently restrain potentially hazardous impulses”
(Shulman et al., n.d.)
Some of the notions in this quote are further speciﬁed in the
paper, such as the regions associated with each system. Still, other
important notions, such as reward sensitivity, remain unspeciﬁed
and thus leave quite some room for interpretation. As we will try to
show, one of the consequences of this lack of speciﬁcity is that the
model allows for the generation of a virtually unlimited number
of testable hypotheses, which may be inconsistent with each other
but that are all consistent with this general claim.
For example, reward sensitivity does not describe a cognitive
or a neurobiological process. Still it is suggested that activity in
the socio-emotional system (including ventral striatum) is asso-
ciated with increased reward sensitivity. However, we striatal
activity can represent different processes and reward sensitivity
can mean different things. Thus, the consequence of such a deﬁni-
tion is that any ﬁnding that shows greater ventral striatal activity
in teenagers compared to other groups might count as evidence for
1 tal Co
t
T
e
c
i
r
g
b
t
r
a
2
n
d
H
b
i
r
m
u
s
h
(
m
t
t
a
s
u
e
e
a
b
t
p
q
ﬁ
S
t
h
p
l
o
h
c
r
m
i
s
i
t
m
o
e
t
r
i
t
d
t40 W.  van den Bos, B. Eppinger / Developmen
he DS model, independently of what the underlying mechanism is.
hus, one study may  claim that adolescent risk is caused by socio-
motional process X (e.g. outcome processing), whereas another
laims it is caused by socio-emotional process Y (e.g. reward antic-
pation). However, even if these are very different processes the
esults (increased striatal activity) are still be consistent with the
eneral claim of the DS model.
A related issue is that the networks of brain regions identiﬁed
y the heuristic models compromise a very large set of structures
hat are involved in very different functions. This inaccuracy with
espect to the anatomy is particularly relevant in case of the stri-
tum, which is a very heterogeneous structure (Haber and Knutson,
010). For example, ﬁnding a certain pattern of activity in the
ucleus accumbens versus the dorsal medial striatum has very
ifferent functional implications (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2015).
owever, currently it seems that ﬁnding a trend in either one would
e consistent with the DS model, irrespectively of speciﬁc anatom-
cal localization and associated function.
Furthermore, risk-taking itself is not well deﬁned and is cur-
ently measured using various tools (self-report and behavioral
easures) that differ on many aspects and whose outcomes meas-
res are known to be uncorrelated (e.g. BART and IGT; for review
ee Schonberg et al., 2011). This inconsistency raises the question
ow well each of these measures is related to real-world outcomes
construct validity). Again, the bottom line is that ﬁnding a develop-
ental trend in any one of these measures will in principle validate
he model.
Interestingly, both papers present the notion that behavior or
he activity within the affective/socio-emotional system may “vary
s function of stimuli, context or task demand” as important revi-
ions of earlier versions of the models. However, it is still largely
nknown what these “context” or the “task demands” are. Richards
t al. (2013) provide probably the best overview of all these differ-
nt effects in context of reward based paradigms, but this paper
lso illustrates the difﬁculty of synthesizing these speciﬁc effects
ased on to the more abstract level of heuristics. The problem is
hat, without further speciﬁcation, such a general statement about
ossible context effects introduces more degrees of freedom and
uestions the generalizability of existing results (external validity).
In sum, the large degrees of freedom due to lack of speci-
city makes the heuristic models in a practical sense un-falsiﬁable.
trictly speaking, for a heuristic model that is not a problem. Heuris-
ics should guide the formulations of novel hypotheses, and those
ypotheses, not the heuristic, should be falsiﬁable. Still as we
ointed out, usefulness can and should be questioned. Indeed the
arge number of degrees of freedom also leads to limited constraints
n the hypothesis space and therefore limits the usefulness of these
euristics. In addition, as MacKenzie (2003) pointed out, that when
oncepts are not well deﬁned this not only leads to weak theo-
etical rational for hypotheses but also to misspeciﬁcation of the
easurement model (e.g. which task to use, the localization and
nterpretation of brain activity etc.)
Given the lack of speciﬁcity in constructs, such as system
trength or maturation, the three different DS models presented
n Fig. 1 are in a practical sense indistinguishable. That is, it is hard
o think of a testable hypothesis that could be derived from one
odel but not the others, or data that would be consistent with
ne but not another model (indeed Shulman et al., n.d. acknowl-
dge that all models are based on the same data). As a result it is
herefore it is at this stage probably also not useful to discuss the
elative value of each model compared to the others.
So where do we go from here? As pointed out there is room for
mprovement in the heuristic models. However, we argue that at
his stage there are three recommendations that could have more
irect positive impact on developmental neuroscience than trying
o improve our heuristic models. First, we should recognize thegnitive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 138–144
speciﬁc role of heuristic models and stop using heuristic model as
cognitive models that can be tested, but rather use them to derive
testable hypothesis. We  will illustrate how this misuse may  lead
to conceptual confusion and provides the illusion of progress. Sec-
ond, in order to achieve real progress we need to think more deeply
in terms of cognitive processes and cognitive neuroscience mod-
els. That is, a strong focus on cognitive processes will facilitate
understanding the relation between changes in brain and behavior,
and help understand how different experimental tasks and studies
interconnect.
Third, we  should recognize that a substantial amount of the
work that we do is exploratory not conﬁrmatory. We  cannot always
be speciﬁc, or generate a proper hypothesis, simply due to lack of
knowledge. However, exploratory science should not be seen as
a lesser form of science, but it should be acknowledged that null
hypothesis signiﬁcant testing (NHST) statistics are not appropriate,
and p values not meaningful, in this context. Instead we should use
exploratory data analyses techniques like factor analyses and cross-
validation. Developmental cognitive neuroscience will thrive when
we rely on, and integrate, both the empiricist (correlational) and
rational (hypothesis testing) modes of science (Cronbach, 1957).
In the next section we address the ﬁrst and second point more
extensively, the third point is beyond the scope of this paper and
has been argued for more extensively by others (e.g. Biswal et al.,
2010).
2. Cognitive models and processes
“Neuroscience is rapidly accumulating a wealth of data at multi-
ple levels ranging from molecules to cells to circuits to systems.
However, in the absence of cognitive theory, this effort runs
the risk of mere “stamp collecting”, or the tendency to catalog
the phenomena of the brain without gaining understanding or
explanation.”
(Frank and Badre, 2015)
2.1. Consistency Fallacy
The heuristic models have inspired many plausible, yet idiosyn-
cratic hypotheses. That is, most studies in developmental cognitive
neuroscience have used a unique set of age comparisons, unique
experimental tasks, and unique statistical models for imaging anal-
yses. For instance, consider the studies relevant to adolescent
reward sensitivity mentioned in the Shulman paper. This list con-
tains studies on risk and intertemporal choice, studies that focus
on the moment of choice or moment of outcome, and studies that
have no behavior at all. Many developmental trends are localized
in many different brain regions using various methods of analy-
ses (see Richards et al., 2013 for an overview). Even though it is
clear that these studies report on very different types of processes
associated with activity in different brain regions, their results may
appear consistent with each other because they are all consistent
with parts of the same heuristic model.
However, this sense of accumulating evidence is misleading and
the result of the consistency fallacy (Coltheart, 2013). That is, claim-
ing support for a theory when you report results that are consistent
with the theory. However, “When neuroimaging data from an exper-
iment are consistent with predictions from a particular theory, this
cannot be offered as evidence in support of that theory unless it can
be shown that there were possible other outcomes of the experiment
that are inconsistent with the theory—outcomes that would have fal-
siﬁed predictions from the theory had they been obtained” (Coltheart,
2013).
As we pointed out above due the level speciﬁcity of the con-
structs and the option to invoke non-described variables (context),
W.  van den Bos, B. Eppinger / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 138–144 141
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t is practically impossible to obtain outcomes that would have
alsiﬁed the theory.
Note, however, that this issue arises because experimental data
re directly related to a heuristic model, which is simply a cate-
ory mistake. The heuristic model should only be used to generate
ypotheses, and these hypotheses should be tested against the data.
f course, that does not mean that new empirical ﬁndings can be
sed to update our heuristic models. It is therefore also very useful
o review the numerous studies that were inspired by the heuristic
odels.
However, at this point we should focus on understanding the
elations between the many empirical results of the different stud-
es, rather than evaluating each individually to see whether it
rovides afﬁrmation of a model on a more abstract level. The dan-
er is that if we are only able to relate our results to each other on
uch an abstract level we are basically “stamp collecting” (Frank and
adre, 2015). That is, performing many excellent studies but not
urthering understanding or explanation because there is no real
ramework to connect the different results. Here we  suggest that
rogress will be possible by developing more comprehensive cog-
itive models and the speciﬁcation of processes (and experimental
aradigms).
.2. What makes a good cognitive neuroscience model?
Historically cognitive models have been labeled as symbolic
odels. That is, they consist of a symbol system, which can thought
f as set of distinct mental representations (Newell & Simon,
976; Putnam, 1960). This symbols are manipulated on the basis
f explicit rules, which can be though of as cognitive processes.
usemeyer and Diederich (2010) suggest that in contrast to con-
eptual (heuristic) models, cognitive models aim to explain one
r more of the basic cognitive processes, or explain how these
rocesses interact. That is, cognitive models are derived from the
asic principles of cognition. The main advantage of cognitive over
euristic models is that they allow us make logically valid pre-
ictions. Moreover, when mathematically formalized, cognitive
odels can also make quantitative predictions. Of course, this abil-
ty to make precise predictions about the results of experimental
anipulations comes at the cost of a greater speciﬁcity, which may
ead to the fragmentation of a research ﬁeld.
David Marr and Tomaso Poggio (1976) proposed that cognitive
euroscience models should consist of three levels of analyses; a
omputational, an algorithmic and a physical implementation level.
he computational level is based on an abstract problem analysis,
hich means to decompose the task that is to be performed into its
onstituent parts (akin to a cognitive model). The algorithmic level
peciﬁes a formal process that translates input to a cognitive sys-
em to output (a process model). Finally, the implementation level
efers to how the cognitive process is implemented in the brain. It is
lear that certain problems can be solved by an endless number of
ifferent algorithms (different cognitive theories)(Churchland andan et al., n.d.
Sejnowski, 1988), however we are mainly interested which one of
those represents the human mind. Imposing the constraint that
the model must be implemented in the human neural architec-
ture has been extremely helpful in constraining the search space of
algorithmic (process) models (Forstmann et al., 2011).
Taken together, we suggest that a good cognitive neuroscience
model should have three building blocks: (1) It needs a good cog-
nitive model of the task that is to be performed but this cognitive
model should be broad enough to be generalizable, (2) it has to
specify the processes that translates input (stimulus) into output
(behavior) and, (3) it has to account for the neurobiological con-
straints in terms of the functional and structural organization of
the brain. This further necessitates that (4)the theory makes pre-
dictions about the relation between process and speciﬁc neural
measures. One example for a successful implementation of such
a theory is the case of reinforcement learning. Based on behav-
ioral ﬁndings in bees and based on knowledge about dopamine
neurons in the bee brain Montague and colleagues (Montague
et al., 1995) developed a neurophysiological plausible model of
bee foraging. The model was  inspired by an RL algorithm that
was borrowed from artiﬁcial intelligence and that learns to predict
future reward value based on reward prediction errors (the dif-
ference between the predicted and the experienced reward). The
model proved to be extremely successful in providing a mechanis-
tic explanation for foraging behavior in bees and triggered a wealth
of model-based studies in primates and humans that explain the
neurophysiological mechanisms underlying reinforcement learn-
ing (Schultz et al., 1997). What we gain from such a model is the
ability to predict behavior and brain mechanisms on a qualitative
level. If the model is formulized, which at some level of complex-
ity has to be, we  can even use it to make quantitative predictions
about our outcome variables, such as neural activity (Busemeyer
and Diederich, 2010).
One issue that arises when moving from a heuristic to a cogni-
tive model is that the level of speciﬁcity of the cognitive model
is much higher. That is, a certain cognitive model may  only be
applied to a limited range of scenarios or tasks (e.g. description
based risk taking). For example, instead of subsuming choice pro-
cesses during delay discounting and risky decision-making under
the umbrella construct of reward sensitivity we now have to spec-
ify the actual processes that allow individuals to integrate their
subjective perception of time, probability and value when making
value-based decisions. The advantage of this approach is that for
each of these processes we can independently establish the devel-
opmental trajectories and thus get a more detailed understanding
of the mechanisms underlying developmental change in behavior.
For instance, using this framework two recent papers have identi-
ﬁed to possible processes related to developmental differences in
reinforcement learning; (1) increased activity in response to posi-
tive (but not negative) prediction error in the striatum (Cohen et al.,
2010), and (2) differences in the value updating process associ-
ated with developmental changes in functional striatum-prefrontal
142 W.  van den Bos, B. Eppinger / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 138–144
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ay  relate to other processes involved in value-based decision-making.
onnectivity (van Den Bos et al., 2012). Finally, capitalizing on
xisting cognitive models may  support more meaningful gener-
lizations across multiple tasks and scenarios. In the following
e will shortly discuss two such models. One of them originates
rom cognitive neuroscience (value-based decision-making theory
Rangel et al., 2008)), and one is a genuine developmental theory
the interactive specialization model (Johnson, 2011)).
The value-based decision-making model (see Fig. 1; Rangel et al.,
008) summarizes the ﬁve component processes of value-based
ecision-making: (1) The individual has to compute a representa-
ion of the decision problem that is, the internal and external states
s well as the potential courses of actions. (2) The decision-maker
as to assign a (subjective) value to the available actions. (3) The dif-
erent values have to be compared to select an action. (4) After the
ecision the outcome has to be evaluated. (5) Finally, the outcome
valuation has to be used to reﬁne predictions (learning).
Note that a key part of this framework is that cognitive pro-
esses operate on values and expectations that are constructed
nd intrinsically subjective. Importantly the model also provides
 framework to compare and integrate different types of values,
uch as social and monetary outcomes, on a common scale (for
xample van den Bos et al., 2013). As such it provides a unique
uantitative framework for understanding of how social context
odulate speciﬁc decision processes in adolescence. Furthermore,
his taxonomy of decision processes can be useful in dissociating
evelopmental differences in the different component processes
uring decision-making. As such it is helpful to identify which of
hese processes are developing and which are important for under-
tanding adolescent speciﬁc choice patterns. Additionally, this can
elp identify the developmental speciﬁc effects of affective states
n decision processes (e.g. it may  effect learning but not value
omparison), another topic which is particularly relevant for under-
tanding adolescent behavior. Finally, it could provide a very useful
odel for integrating developmental differences across a range of
ecision paradigms and might thus allow inferences across multi-
le domains (e.g. risky, social and intertemporal decision-making;
Glimcher and Fehr, 2013).. The example highlights how functional imaging data related to outcome evaluation
Here we  consider what it means to apply such a modeling
perspective to understanding the neurocognitive development of
simple reward-based decision making. The current literature on
developmental differences in reward processing shows several
inconsistencies. Richards et al. (2013) have provided an excellent
mapping of all these different results, breaking them down by type
of task (passive reward, instrumental reward and decision-making)
and phase of task (e.g. decision, anticipation and feedback). The goal
of the paper, from the perspective from the heuristic models, is to
ﬁgure out under which circumstances one ﬁnds speciﬁc activation
patterns (e.g. adolescent peak in striatum) for speciﬁc phases of the
tasks (e.g. feedback processing). However, from a cognitive mod-
eling perspective one would ask a different type of question; how
could greater ventral striatal response during outcome processing,
in any of these tasks, be meaningfully related choice behavior? Sim-
ply correlating activation levels with some external measure of risk
would not inform us about the underlying mechanism. The striatal
response happens after the decisions are made so it is unclear how
it can prima facie be related to the choice process itself. Moreover,
what if the peak in outcome related activity is reported in rela-
tion to passive reward task or instrumental tasks in which there is
a response but no choice? The heuristic models don’t force us to
further investigate these mechanistic questions because they care
less about how things happened and more about what happened
(increased ventral striatal activity). In contrast, the cognitive mod-
eling perspective forces us be more precise about the underlying
mechanisms, connecting stimulus to response.
According to two paradigmatic value based decision models,
(e.g. reinforcement learning (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008) or pre-
dictive coding (Friston, 2010), outcomes are always evaluated
in relation to prior expectations. This suggest that adolescents
may  show different outcome related responses because have (1)
different subjective expectations (e.g. differences in probability
weighting function (Gonzalez and Wu,  1999), or (2) different value
functions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)). For instance adolescents
could subjectively think the risky, but positive, outcome was less
likely to happen (even if objective probability was the same). In
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hat case the increased activity could reﬂect greater positive sur-
rise (positive prediction error). Although this explanation is able
o make inferences about the decision phase based upon how out-
omes are processed, this would not directly explain increased risk
aking. That is, a smaller subjective probability should in principle
e associated with less risk taking.
Another alternative is that adolescents assign a higher subjec-
ive value to the actual outcome that they receive, regardless of
heir expectation (for similar argument see (Vaidya et al., 2013).
ifferences in the shape of the value function (which translates
bjective to subjective value,) could mean that for adolescence
he large reward associated with risky option indeed has a higher
ubjective value. For instance, it is possible that money has more
subjective) value for adolescents because they have a smaller
udget than adults, but more spending freedom/opportunity than
hildren. Note that if this were true, we would expect adolescents
o take more risks when presented with the same set of gambles,
ven if they would have similar risk preferences as adults.
Unfortunately, based on the existing data it is hard to tell to
hat extend subjective value or subjective probability differences
lay a role in developmental changes in brain activity and behav-
or. However, the ﬁeld of decision neuroscience provides plenty of
asks and analytical tools to measure these constructs (for overview
ee Glimcher and Fehr, 2013), which can be easily applied to
nderstand developmental processes. Again, these frameworks and
ccompanying tools can now also be used to estimate difference in
ocial values and differential impact of affect across development.
hus, although we are not yet able to synthesize existing results,
nd thus only able to raise new questions, we  hoped to illustrate
hat these questions, and related constructs, may  help to better
nderstand the underlying processes. We  are conﬁdent that when
e have a more detailed understanding of the development of com-
onent processes in value based decision-making we can (1) better
redict when an where we will ﬁnd developmental differences,
nd (2) how processes of different measured in different tasks are
elated. This is probably a quicker route that trying out numerous
ask variations and see if a pattern will emerge in the data. Note that
his approach does not necessarily requires advanced mathemat-
cal modeling, but rather a more detailed account of task relevant
rocesses and how they are related (see for instance Fig. 2). Further-
ore, when we have a better idea of which process we evoke with
ur task we have to rely less on reverse inference when interpreting
ur imaging data.
Finally, we would like to stress that the interactive special-
zation model (Johnson, 2011) might provide an important link
etween changes on the social behavioral level and changes on the
eurobiological level. For example, one could imagine that develop-
ental periods that are characterized by speciﬁc interaction types
infant–caregiver interactions, peer interactions in adolescents)
ight trigger activity-dependent interactions between regions that
ead to a sharpening of their respective functions and response
roperties. On the other hand, social behavioral changes should be
ccompanied by changes in the functional connectivity between
everal networks (Johnson, 2011). This model seems to ﬁt in very
aturally with the account provided by Nelson and colleagues (n.d.).
e  realize that integrating this might be a complicated endeavor.
owever, being able to specify the processes that link neurobio-
ogy to changes in social behavior in different age groups referring
o interactive specialization might be useful.
. ConclusionThe papers by Shulman et al. (n.d.) and Nelson et al. (n.d.)
rovide interesting and useful heuristic frameworks to think about
he development of motivational and cognitive control processes
s well as the development of social behavior. As outlined abovegnitive Neuroscience 17 (2016) 138–144 143
heuristic models have a great value in setting research agendas
and stimulating the evolution of cognitive neuroscience theories of
development. However, heuristic theories have limited predictive
power: they do not allow making precise predictions about how
development affects the underlying cognitive and neurobiological
processes. It is the natural evolution for a new ﬁeld to shift from
the heuristic phase of agenda setting to a more critical hypothe-
sis testing and falsiﬁcation phase (Eysenck, 1997). Here we argued
that in order to advance the ﬁeld of developmental cognitive neu-
roscience it is time to start making this transition. We should aim
at improving our heuristic models but at the same time we should
shift focus toward developing more precise, but testable, cognitive
neuroscience models.
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